Boer War (Europe 1900 2014)

October 26, 1899

The discovery of gold in South Africa, particularly in portions of the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, led increasingly to the Boers fearing the large numbers of mostly-British foreigners entering their territories to labor in the mines. The fear was justified, as the British government attempted to annex the Boer states in 1880 (this was fought off) and the British did, in fact, see the recent arrival of British subjects in the Boer states as a potential justification for future annexation. By 1895, foreign "outlanders" outnumbered the Boers in many parts of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. A British scheme in 1895 to seize Johannesburg from the Transvaal failed utterly, and it was clear that the British government had been complicit in the treachery. The Jameson Raid ended in disaster, but the Boers realized that outright war would soon be upon them.

In 1897, the Boer governments formed a military alliance and purchased tens of thousands of modern Mauser magazine rifles and Krupp artillery pieces. Outlanders still poured into the Boer states, however, and Britain demanded that the Boers recognize the rights of British subjects in the Orange Free State and Transvaal. The Governor and Prime Minister of the British Cape Colony called outright for the annexation of the Boer republics; plans of invasion were openly discussed.

Not ignorant of the British plans, the Boers prepared for war themselves. In early 1899 the Cape Colony government issued an ultimatum, demanding full civil rights (including the vote and property ownership) for the British subjects in Transvaal; by this time, British subjects outnumbered the Boers considerably. Granting property and voting rights would, effectively, dissolve the Transvaal Republic.

The Boers refused, and joining together in military alliance, the two Republics issued their own ultimatum to the largest empire in the world: back down, or be invaded.

In England, the ultimatum was received as a joke. Two tiny Afrikaans republics, with no standing army, and only a militia of farmers and laborers, at war with Great Britain and all her might? The British laughed and expected the Boers to back down.

They didn't. On October 11, 1899, the smallest republics in the world declared war on an empire that spanned a quarter of the land mass of the world. Within days, 30,000 Boer men and boys had rallied to arms, Mauser rifles in hand, and the expert riders mounted up on their own horses to take the war to the British Empire.

Unexpectedly, the war so far has been a continual disaster for the British. Like David against Goliath, the scrappy Boer republics invaded the British colonies in South Africa, driving towards the capitals of Cape Colony and Natal. By the end of October the Boers had surrounded the tiny British and native force at Ladysmith, an important railroad hub and garrison in Natal. Soon, the peasant Boer farmers were bombarding Ladysmith with modern Krupp siege guns.

Boers also besieged the important mining town of Kimberly, the second largest settlement of Cape Colony and the site of a major diamond mine owned by the massive De Beers firm. Cecil Rhodes, architect of the British Empire's policy in Africa, is among those trapped in the besieged city.. More Krupp shells fell from the sky.

More Boer forces encircled Mafeking, a crucial administrative center located on the main railway, and subjected it to a siege as well. Even more Krupp shells battered the outnumbered British defenders. Shocked by the speed, ferocity, and efficiency of the Boers, who seemed to naturally understand how to fight a modern war, the British soon found themselves not just outnumbered, but outclassed as well. Only a few units had modern weapons, the rest of the British were armed with old single shot rifles and leftover artillery from the Zulu wars. Weeks passed, as the Boers continued to besiege several cities and invade Cape Colony and Natal, taking the fight to the British.

Things went downhill for the British from there...

December 31, 1899

In three rapid engagements, the kommando forces of the Boer Republics have inflicted staggering losses to the British in South Africa, within a span of six days. Confident of victory against the untrained and uncoordinated Boer forces, the British launched relief expeditions to lift the sieges of Ladysmith, Kimberly, and Mafeking. A full British Army corps under General Sir Redvers Henry Buller, a distinguished commander, undertook a counteroffensive to relieve the besieged cities and crush the pesky Boers.

Instead, on December 10, 1899 an attempt to retake the railway junction at Stormberg resulted in a devastating British defeat, turning back an entire British column with heavy losses from Boer rifle and artillery fire.

The next day, 14,000 British troops marching to relieve Kimberly ran into a Transvaal army of 8,000 Boer troops. When the British attacked, they marched out in traditional order, lines of riflemen advancing across the field. Regiments steeped in the history of the British Empire -- the Black Watch, Argyll Highlanders, Coldstream Guards, Grenadier Guards, Life Guards, and Scots Guards -- kept perfect dress, as professional soldiers are expected to do. They followed the drill-book to the letter. They died in heaps, as the Boers cut into them with murderously accurate Mauser rifle, and mowed them like grass before the scythe with a trio of Maxim guns. Order was soon lost, and the British broke and retreated beyond the range of the Boer guns, leaving a thousand men on the battlefield.

It got worse. On December 15, General Buller himself led 14,000 British troops in the third British column, en route to relieve Ladysmith. He encountered General Louis Botha with barely 4,000 Boer troops at Colenso. Just after dawn the British broke camp and spent an hour conducting parade ground drill before commencing the attack. Again, the Boers assumed defensive positions and opened fire with Mauser and Maxim. The slaughter was terrible; Buller lost another thousand men, and even the futile heroism worthy of several VCs was not enough to save most of his artillery from being captured by the Boers.

Three defeats in five days; the news hit the British public like a ton of bricks. It was truly a Black Week. Some of the finest regiments in the British Army had been decimated, and nearly 3,000 men had been lost. The Boers lost under 300. Global sympathy for the Boers has skyrocketed, as the German press sings Botha's praises, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands promises to defy a British blockade, and adventure-seeking volunteers travel to South Africa to join the Boer armies. In England, the mood is dour. In Scotland, where the news of staggering Highland casualties was particularly terrible, support for the war is rapidly waning. As for the Irish... well, suffice to say, the thought of Irish regiments getting shot up to enforce British domination over a similar proud, independent-minded people is not far spread.

As 1899 ends, General Buller is rethinking his strategy, and is now combining his army to make a single thrust against the Boers, wielding overwhelming numbers, to break through and relieve Ladysmith at last. In the meanwhile, he awaits directives from Whitehall.

January 7, 1900

Two German steamers, the Herzog and Bundesrath, have been stopped on the high seas by British warships off the coast of Portuguese East Africa near Delagoa Bay. According to remarks by the British consul in Lorenzo Marques, the searches concluded that both ships were carrying "suspicious" passengers of German and Dutch nationality, with camping and trekking supplies, along with a total of over 3,000 Mauser and Mannlicher rifles and 600 shells of 75mm Krupp artillery ammunition. Some of the passengers were later found to be German Army officers in civilian dress.

The German consular authority at Lorenzo Marques has vociferously complained about the "illegal and outrageous" seizure of German shipping by British warships in international waters in time of peace.

British authorities say the seizure was legal because the steamers were carrying "contraband of war" to aid the Boers.

German authorities say the seizure is illegal because regardless of the cargo, the ship was not going to a belligerent port, but from a neutral German port to a neutral Portuguese port. It is Portugal's responsibility to determine what is or is not contraband to be allowed to enter the belligerent territory of the Transvaal, the Germans claim.

News of the seizures has reached Whitehall and Potsdam Palace, where it is making front page headlines in both Britain and Germany.

January 28, 1900

Explicit orders directly from Whitehall have commenced a British counter-offensive against the Boer Republics, as the British Army masses an overwhelming percentage of its specialized units in the South African theater. In addition to engineers and a large quantity of Maxim guns, the British have somehow managed to rapidly trundle a staggering number of heavy guns, including siege artillery, to their field armies. Rush-delivered from their quiet posts in England, they had barely arrived before being assigned to the offensive. Ladysmith remained besieged, and public outcry in the streets of London and Bristol and Portsmouth and elsewhere demanded that pride be reclaimed, honor vindicated, and the prestige of the British Empire restored by the lifting of the siege. In London, Lord Salisbury’s Conservatives were nervously fretting; defeat in South Africa could topple their government and install a majority of Liberals in the Commons. The only question, then, was which way to take to Ladysmith? Whitehall settled on the direct approach from Durban, crossing the Tugela. This was precisely the same road that General Buller took in the previous relief attempt, which ended at the Battle of Conelso on the bloody banks of the Tugela River.

Without pausing to consider the dichotomy of ordering a rapid, spirited offensive with an army that is dragging a siege artillery train, Whitehall ordered General Redvers Buller to march from Durban with the newly-created Army of Natal and lift the siege of Ladysmith. Buller's massive force marched out from Durban in column, the pipes wailing out patriotic tunes, followed by an equally massive supply train. The quartermasters were horrified. For two days the march was uneventful, until January 24, a few miles south of Colenso, when Boer pickets and scouts were observed.

Colenso was the site of a previous Boer triumph. The Tugela River is not a large stream but is crossed only at a select few drifts (the old railroad bridge is long gone). Across the drifts, men might wade across in chest-deep water. General Buller, who had fought here before barely a month earlier, where Lord Roberts' son had been killed (and recommended for a VC), recalled the disaster. Last time, with about 20,000 British troops including heavy 4.7-inch naval guns, the crossing was repulsed. Poor Buller's orders again required him to rely on his heavy artillery, which was painfully slow and drawn by bullocks, to blast the Boers out of their positions. "Avoid direct initial frontal assaults," Whitehall ordered, and directed him to use his artillery. Then, by all the logic of the civilians in broadcloth suits who wrote the orders from Whitehall, Buller would "force a crossing" through the artillery-shattered, blasted Boers and gloriously relieve Ladysmith. It was precisely the same thing that had been tried in December; the only modification was more of everything.

General Botha, commanding the Boer army at Ladysmith, understood that for the British to relieve Ladysmith, a crossing would have to be forced on the Tugela. Using his skilled Boer scouts, as comfortable in the saddle as anywhere and intimately familiar with the territory, Botha could learn of any British movements and respond accordingly to prepare a defense in their path. When Lord Roberts marched out from Durban on January 22, flags flew at the head of each division and bagpipers squealed out the pace of march; a blind Boer could have known the British were coming. Botha did not expect Lord Roberts to take the main road through Colenso again, not after the disaster there of December 15, 1899. Yet Botha’s scouts reported the same approach, and at each increment Botha grew all the more incredulous. The British were coming back to the slaughter-pen of Colenso. And this time, they were in strength: over 40,000 British infantry, twice as many as before, but seemingly more equipped for the defensive than the offensive. They brought two hundred heavy water-cooled Maxim machine guns, useful only in fixed defensive lines, and only fifty light artillery pieces. The rest of the artillery, 115 pieces of it, was all heavier and hauled by bullocks. The ammunition, especially for the 5.4-inch and 6-inch siege guns, weighed many hundreds of pounds per shell. One heavy cart was required to haul one or two shells.

At first General Botha expected a scheme, that the British column arriving at Colenso on the afternoon of January 24th must be a diversionary force. By its massive size, however, Botha determined this must be another blunt and typically British attempt to cross the river. Botha’s positions along the Tugela were those left over from December, but he feared these would not hold against a determined attack. Taking a bold gamble, he drew six Transvaal kommando units of about 3,000 men out of the trenches around Ladysmith and redeployed them, on the night of the 24th, along the defensive points on the Tugela. It gave Botha scarcely 8,000 men in total, with a mere 26 guns, of which three were 1-pounder Maxim “pom-pom” guns, essentially Maxim machine guns scaled up to fire about 60 1-pound exploding shells per minute. These guns were carefully concealed along the kopjes and rocky escarpments between 600 and 1500 yards from the known fords, or drifts, along the Tugela at Colenso.

It took all day of the 25th for Buller to bring his heavy artillery up. In the meanwhile, his army deployed along the Tugela where, in places, the half-decomposed bodies of the last British troops who fought here were still stinking in the summer sun. British scouts reported that to the British right (downstream) was a waterfall on the Tugela, and a section of impassable river for several miles. To their left (upstream) the Boers had entangled the Tugela with gnarled knots of rusty barbed wire, much of it left over from December but much of it enhanced even further.

But there was not a Boer to be seen. Every now and then a crack of a Mauser, sniping at British scouts who crept too close to the Tugela's banks, but otherwise, nothing. "A haunting, dreadful stillness and silence," a British infantry officer wrote. "It is one thing to know your enemy is there and to see him. Yet to know he is there, and to see him not, disturbs me and my men in ways I cannot adequately describe."

Not playing by the proper rules of war, Boer fortifications are not above ground. Their trenches cleverly utilize the topography of the earth, and are invisible until their adversaries are well within Mauser range. They utilize any natural depression, any convenient rock formation, and like the Zulus they fought for so long, they stay out of sight until the last moment. "It is suspected Boer fortifications will be met," the orders from Whitehall to Buller read, and so Buller was simply to blast them away with his heavy artillery, and " bombard and weaken any enemy positions in preparation for a frontal push." Again the civilians in suits in London failed to comprehend modern war, and again all faith was placed in British artillery.

Buller ordered the attack, to commence with an artillery bombardment of the Boer positions, as Whitehall directed. The December attack had commenced the same way, with Buller blasting away for two days at the Boer entrenchments. This barrage was ineffective in 1899 and it was ineffective in 1900 as well, owing largely to the very well concealed Boer positions. Most of the bombardment was from the lighter British guns, which had more ammunition, but they fired almost completely blind. There were no convenient Boer fortresses to direct fire upon; the rocks and the fields were shelled indiscriminately, and occasionally a big 6-inch howitzer shell would scream down with a roar, producing a lovely crater. But the bombardment, that lasted a day and a night and consumed a massive quantity of ordnance, was mostly ineffective. Lucky shells blew some Boers to bits, but most of the ordnance blanketed the bank of the river while the main Boer lines were considerably further in. The greatest effect of the bombardment was psychological, as old Boer farmers and youths huddled in narrow trenches as the earth shook with a fury they had never believed possible. None slept and some crept away, overwhelmed and terrified.

On the 27th, the attack went forward shortly after noon. Buller had fired off most of his artillery, and many of his officers declared that the Boers were not even there, and that he had wasted his shells. There were four crossings open to the British on the Tugela, from east to west they were the two fords at the former iron bridges, Pont Drift, and Bridle Drift. In December the attack had been pressed at the bridges and Pont Drift, with disastrous consequences, and some lessons had been learned: Bridle Drift, the best and widest ford, would be the main focus now. Buller had so many troops, though, that crossing them all at Bridle Drift would be impractical and a poor use of his numerical advantage; crossings would therefore be made at all four.

Passing rains had left the fields muddy beneath the healthy green grass along the Tugela’s banks. As the British columns approached, 12-pounder shells screamed overhead, but still not a sound or sight from the defenders. Aside from the roar of the British guns, it was eerily quiet. “We expected the barrage to have the effect of a stick in a wasp’s nest,” one British artillery officer wrote, “but not a sign or a move did the Boers make anywhere.” In the December battle, Botha had planned to fire only as the British were engaged in the crossing, with some number of men already across the Tugela, directly beneath the Boer guns. Botha knew the stubborn British would not abandon a crossing with some men already over, and therefore they would continue feeding men into the hornet’s nest until their army was destroyed. But in December his men fired early, unable to resist the beautiful targets the British made on the far bank. This time, the order was repeated well: do not fire until the signal. Let the British get a sizable number across, and then open up with everything.

In four columns, British infantry nervously approached the Tugela, expecting a hellish fire at any second. Thousands of boots churned up mud, out from which rose up the putrid bodies of their fallen comrades of December that had been buried in shallow graves, still buttoned up in uniform. The bagpipes squealed, and each column reached the muddy, swollen waters of the Tugela. Pioneers went across first, hauling heavy ropes and stakes which were beaten into the mud of the far shore, stringing lifelines across the river. Even in relatively shallow chest-deep water, should a man slip with rifle, pack, and ammunition, he might be dragged down. The British artillery ceased fire around 1:00pm, as company by company the head British regiments worked their way across the Tugela. They immediately reformed their ranks on the far side, with officers like Major General A. FitzRoy Hart riding up and down the battalions, snapping at sergeants and shaking his riding crop at his officers.

Behind the hills and kopjes, a few thousand meters away and completely unknown to the British and untouchable by the British artillery, were a number of Krupp guns that the Staatsartillerie (the only professional full-time troops of the Transvaal) had already sighted in on known points along the Tugela. Botha’s nervous Boers, thousands of them, scattered among the kopjes, behind rocks and trenches cleverly concealed on the far side of rolling heights, watched the British form up. Soon enough, as if triumphant, the bagpipes started, the formations on the riverbanks began to advance to make space for the next battalions fo cross over, and Botha sprung his trap. The Krupp guns fired. Concealments were torn away and the murderous oversized Maxims began flinging explosive shells the size of goose eggs into the British that had crossed the river. Moments later the fusillade from thousands of rifles filled the air with the sharp crack of supersonic lead. Rifle ball and pom-pom shell and Krupp shrapnel shot seared through the British ranks. A British officer in the rear described it as “the most terrific fire I have ever heard or thought of in my life”. Botha’s trap had been perfectly sprung.

Along the entrenched lines of the heights and kopjes beyond the Tugela, Boer riflemen lay prone, firing through gaps in their rock shelters or from their narrow low trenches elaborately and carefully built over the previous months. Highlander bagpipers made particularly obnoxious targets, and the drone of the pipes quickly stopped. One Boer marksman would later recall that, from his position atop a kopje, he would select a target, take aim, but before he could fire his target would catch a bullet from someone else. The Boer would find another target, and it too would fall before he could pull the trigger. Even so, the British advanced, with General FitzRoy Hart slapping at soldiers who were cowardly enough to seek shelter in the innumerable scattered shell craters. The general's horse was shot from under him. On foot, he directed the attacks, and ordered formations in much the same way as Wellington had done against Napoleon.

Buller ordered a full advance. He would not let part of his army be annihilated across the river. Over the four drifts, his battalions rushed ahead, some of the oldest and finest regiments of the British Army, alongside very shaky colonial infantry, barefoot and armed with old Martini rifles. Botha was right, the British kept coming, unlike in December when they turned about and fled before getting over the Tugela. So far it had been easy, but General Botha was concerned about his ammunition, the large numbers of British that were swarming over the river. Having weakened his lines at Ladysmith, he feared that the besieged garrison there might discover the ruse hoisted upon them and launch a successful breakout. Worse, Botha received an inaccurate report that the British had taken Hlangwhane, a prominent kopje from which British guns could enfilade the Boer line. The Boer general decided, around 3:30pm, to begin a withdrawal back to the Drakensberg Mountains, which would also necessitate lifting the siege of Ladysmith. He hoped, at least, that the casualties inflicted on the British would be catastrophic enough to shock the public in London and impress the worldwide sympathizers.

While Botha ordered the retreat, starting with the precious 1-pounder pom-poms, British officers were beginning to get across the Tugela and take over command of their units. Soon attacks were being launched against the nearest Boer trenches, and the outnumbered defenders fled back towards the rocky heights, being chased by .303 bullets as they ran. The Boer is terrified of the bayonet, and sees little reason to needlessly sacrifice his life for sake of discipline or any other reason, and sees less shame in fleeing when odds turn against him. Angry and happy to do anything other than cringe helplessly behind flimsy cover, the British attacks drove up the heights, into the withering fire of the Boer defenders, but the British could also cover behind the many rocks and return fire as well. One by one, Boer riflemen fired their last cartridge and then slid away from the firing line, of no more use to the battle. By dusk, the Boers had largely abandoned their positions after selling them dearly, but also quitting the fight when the threat of being overrun became significant. The Boers ran to their horses, waiting behind the kopjes, and galloped away into the night, leaving Buller in possession of the field.

From the top of Red Hill, one of the strongest Boer positions, the exhausted British troops could see the shimmering cluster of tin roofs, 10 miles away, that marked the besieged town of Ladysmith.

British casualties were staggering, with over 350 killed outright and thousands wounded, many with very deep and serious wounds caused by surprisingly small fragments from Krupp artillery shells. The artillery has fired through nearly all of the extremely limited ammunition hauled up to front (the railroad, demolished by Boer guerrillas, is not functioning). While the Boers have lifted the siege of Ladysmith, falling back to the Drakensburg Mountains that form the border of the Boer Republics and Natal Colony, it leaves Buller with a shot up army, consuming vast quantity of supplies (he asked the starving Ladysmith garrison for rations for the relieving army), unwieldly in its movements due to the siege artillery train that limits mobility to that of a bull-cart.